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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
IRVIN A. LANGTON,
Pl,aintif!-Appellant,
v.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT, INC., and BOB
HAZE ROBERTS,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12244

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff's brief
is incomplete. On plaintiff's motion defendant Bob Haze
Roberts was dismissed from the action on the morning of
trial (R. 195). References to defendant herein refer only
to defendant International Transport, Inc. The following
statement of facts presents the facts most favorable to
the jury's findings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the morning of June 19, 1969 Bob Haze Roberts, an
employee of defendant International Transport, Inc., was
driving defendant's truck and flatbed trailer north on the
Interstate I-15 collector road on the 1700 South overpass
when the truck broke down (R. 218). Roberts pulled the
truck over as far as he could to the right, turned on all
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the lights (flashing lights and the headlights), set the
brakes and got out to inspect the truck (R. 201). Roberts
and Lloyd Behunin, a co-driver, examined the motor and
found that the crankshaft had broken and the damper had
gone' thrnugh the radiator (R. 202, 226). Roberts told
Behunin to go make a phone call to get the wrecker (R. 202).
Behunin ran off the overpass to a business establishment
to call a wrecker (R. 227). Behunin thought it was three
to four minutes from the time he first got out of the truck
until he was informed there had been an accident (R. 230).
Roberts went around to get the flares out of the cab. He
started walking south along the east side of the truck between the guard rail and the trailer to set the flares
on the overpass ( R. 203). As Roberts was walking toward
the back of the truck the right front of the plaintiff's pickup
truck collided with the left rear of the defendant's trailer
(R. 210). Roberts testified that the truck was stalled three
to five minutes before the accident happened (R. 353).
Plaintiff, a pipefitter for the Denver and Rio Grande
Western Railroad, was driving his pickup from the Roper
Yards (6th West and 2100 South) to the Salt Lake Union
Depot at the time of the accident (R. 382, 387). He was on
an emergency trip to repair a broken water pipe and a
sewer in the cafe (R. 387).
Langton testified :
Q.

(Mr. McRae) Okay. Then as best you can recall
tell them what you do remember.

A.

(Mr. Langton) I entered the collector road behind
a semi and I stayed behind the semi until we got
to the collector road itself off of the entrance road.
I went from the right hand lane to the left hand
lane to pass him; he signalled to come over, and I
fell behind him and then I turned to pass him in
the right hand lane and I remember nothing else.
(382-383)
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Lloyd Robbins, an eye witness to the accident, testified he was driving north on the collector road toward the
17th South overpass when he saw the plaintiff's pickup
truck and another semi truck and trailer traveling north
on the collector road (R. 338). This semi truck was traveling north in the right lane and the plaintiff's pickup was
traveling north in the left hand lane (R. 333-334). All the
vehicles were going approximately 50 m.p.h. (R. 333). The
driver of the semi truck gave a signal and pulled into
the left hand travel lane of the collector road (R. 334).
Langton then drove his pickup truck into the right hand
lane to attempt to pass the moving semi truck on the right
(R. 339).
Robbins testified:
Q.

(Mr. McRae) How could you describe this movement then of the pickup truck into the right land,
did he signal and make a move or how did he make
this move?

A.

(Mr. Robbins) I don't recall seeing a signal. The
impression that I received was the semi truck and
trailer moved into the left hand lane. The panel
truck 01· the pickup truck driver made a decision
to pass that vehicle on the right and almost at the
same time that the tractor trailer was moving into
the left hand lane the pickup truck moved into the
right hand lane behind him. It was almost as
though the two were weaving.

Q. And then immediate impact?

A. Yes. There were not two discreet actions. The
pickup truck did not move after the semi truck
and trailer was completely in the left hand travel
lane or happening at the same time, if I make myself clear. (R. 336)
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Robbins observed the impact of the pickup truck on the
left rear set of tandems of the defendant's trailer (R. 340).
Langton was in the hospital two days (R. 395). He
went back to work on the 15th day of July, 1969 (R. 396).
Dr. Nusbaum testified that Langton had a brain concussion ( R. 249). The doctor also stated that Langton had
a fifty-fifty chance of a complete recovery from the accident.
The jury returned a 6-2 verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
We the jurors impaneled in the above case find
the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant and assess damages as follows:
General Damages
Special Damages
Property Damages

None
$ 868.25
600.00

Total

$1,468.25 (R. 169)

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of
damages or in the alternative for an additur (R. 143).
Defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial on all issues
(R. 144). At the time of hearing on the motions, defendant
moved to amend its motion to allow the verdict returned
by the jury to stand. The trial court allowed the amendment giving counsel for both parties an opportunity to file
briefs (R148-149). The trial court ruled the verdict of the
jury would be allowed to stand (R. 170).
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE JURY VERDICT TO
STAND.
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Judge Douglas Cornaby, Layton City Judge sitting
pro tem, denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages only or for an additur and allowed the jury verdict
to stand stating:
" ... The jury found for the plaintiff and gave him
an award for damages for those listed under specials
and those listed under property damages, but were not
persuaded that plaintiff had suffered further damage
and so said 'none' under general damages. The proof
of permanent injuries was not so conclusive that the
court could say as a matter of law that the jury was
wrong. To then insist that a whole new trail is necessary because they failed to know they should list at
least $1.00 under general damages is incredulous. The
jury didn't ignore generals or leave it blank; they
inserted 'none'." ( R. 171)
This court has previously held that a trial court has
wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for new
trial. Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955); Beck v. Dutchman
Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104, 269 P.2d 867 (1954).
This court has further held that it is reluctant to interfere with the ruling of a trial court on a motion for a new
trial and will do so only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.
King v. Union Pacific Railroad, 117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692
(1949).
If there is substantial evidence, together with fair
inferences that may be drawn therefrom to support the
jury verdict then it should be sustained.

See Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430
(1964) where this court held:
The purpose of a trial is to afford the parties a
full and fair opportunity to present their evidence
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and contentions and to have the issues in dispute be.
tween them determined by a jury. When this objec.
tive has been accomplished, and the trial court has
given its approval thereto by refusing to grant a neu
trial, the judgment should be looked upon with some
degree of verity. The presumption is in favor of its
validity and the burden is upon the appellant to show
some persuasive reason for upsetting it. Under the
cardinal and oft-repeated rule of review, we will not
disturb the jury's finding so long as it is supported bi
substantial evidence that is, evidence which, togethe1
with the fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom
reasonable minds could conclude as the jury did; anc
we will not reverse the judgment entered thereon unles1
in arriving at it substantial and prejudicial error Wai
committed in the sense that in its absence there is i
reasonable likelihood that there would have been i
different result. (emphasis added)

Plaintiff claims the jury failed to follow the instruction:
of the court because they failed to award general damages

The trial court's instruction on damages (No. 26) gav1
the jury discretion to find no general damages. It stated

If you find the issues in favor of the plaintifJ
Irvin A. Langton, and against the defendant, Inter
national Transport Incorporated, it will be your dut
to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, as yo
may find from a preponderance of the evidence wi
fairly and adequately compensate him for any injur
and damage he has sustained as a proximate result o
the defendant's negligence complained of by him. (F
130) (emphasis added)

Plaintiff took no exception to this instruction (R. 43(
432).
The phrase, if any, clearly gave the jury the prerogath
of denying general damages, if they were not proved by
preponderance of the evidence.
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The jury was also instructed that they were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence.
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
witnesses you have a right to take into consideration
their bias, their interest in the result of the suit, or any
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any
is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the
want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to
understand, and their capacity to remember. You
should consider these matters together with all of the
other facts and circumstances which you may believe
have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the
witnesses' statements. (R. 112)
It is clear that the testimony of a witness is no stronger
than left on cross examination. Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah
2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954).

The jury was entitled to believe the statements made
by Dr. Nusbaum on cross examination accurately described
the plaintiff's condition.
Q.

(Mr. Nebeker) Referring down to the bottom
paragraph, and this is from the letter that you
wrote to Dr. Howard, I guess after he has-Mr.
Langton had been referred to you by Dr. Howard.

A.

(Dr. Nusbaum) Yes.

Q. You stated that 'Examination today neurologically

is intact,' is that correct? Down at the bottom
paragraph, is that your statement to Dr. Howard?
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A. That is one of the sentences in that paragraph,
yes. (R. 261-262)

* * *
Q. In your examination you state you, 'Repeat examination today in the office,' and state that,
'demonstrates no definite abnormalities,' is that
correct?

A. That's ri,qht. (R. 264)

*

* ·•·

Q. Okay. Then you go on to say that, 'That the brai11
scan obtained at the Holy Cross Hospital on September 12, 1969, and includes reports which I am
s::mding you was, also, esse11tially negative.' Is the
brain scan the same things as the EEG?

A. Yes.
Q. And you say that in September that was essentially

negative?

A. Essentially negative. Do you mind if I refer to the
report on that? (R. 265)

* * *
Q. Then reading back on that letter of September 16,
you said quote-on the next to the last paragraph,

'I do not believe we have any neurological or persisting neurological complications to Mr. Langton's
recent injury.' Is that your statement to Dr.
Howard?

A. That was my opinion at that time.
Q. You advised him simply to use up the rest of his

dramamine and then discontinue it and that with
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the passage of time all of the symptoms should
resolve spontaneously?
A. That was my opinion at the time.
Q. That was in September of 1969?

A. Yes. (R. 266-267)

* * *
Q. Then on February 26 you wrote another letter to

Dr. Howard and stated, 'I admitted Mr. Langton . . .' and you say, 'tomorrow-briefly to the
Holy Cross Hospital for angiogram study because
of the persisting symptomotology,' and says, 'this
study was unrevealing and I would look for a continued study and improvement for Mr. Langton,
a fairly near term complete recovery,' is that
correct?

A. That was my opinion, yes.
Q. That was written about four months ago?

A. Uh-huh.
Q. To Dr. Howard?

A. Yes. (R. 268)

* * *

Dr. Nusbaum testified that in his opinion the plaintiff
has a fifty-fifty chance of a complete recovery.
Q.

(Mr. Nebeker) But we have to rely on your guess
because you know more about it than the rest of
us, and it would be your testimony-
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A.

(Dr. Nusbaum) Well if I say fifty-fifty it's hard
to be really wrong, if I say that. I think he could
go either way.

Q. You don't want to be held to this absolutely either,

right?

A. Right.
Q. Saying he could get better or he might not?

A. That's right, and I really don't know which one
to say. (R. 271)
The jury was also entitled to infer that since the plaintiff had been on the job continuously from the time he returned except for the one day he went to the hospital for
an angiogram test (which was normal) that he was not
entitled to general damages.
The plaintiff testified:
Q.

(Mr. Nebeker) And you have been on the job continuously since that time except for the one day
that you went to the hospital for this angiogram
test? And this was in June of this year?

A.

(Mr. Langton) Yes.

Q. You have had a good work record at your present
employment, I presume?

A. As far as I know, yes.
Q. That is you haven't had any periods of long ill-

ness where you have been off work for a long time?

A. No.
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Q. Are you receiving the same rate of pay now that
you were receiving at that time, or have you had
a cost of living increase?
A. We have had an increase. (R. 396)
The plaintiff admitted that he drove his car every day.
Q.

(Mr. Nebeker) During the average week do you
leave the Roper yards would say every day during
your employment, or is it less often than that?

A.

(Mr. Langton) I would say I leave it every day.

Q. You leave it every day in your truck?

A. Yes.
Q. And you either drive north or south to some

specific assignment?

A. That's right. (R. 413)
The jury could infer from this fact that the plaintiff
had not sustained an injury which prevented him from
"pursuing the ordinary affairs of life."
The only evidence offered with regard to lost wages
was the plaintiff's own testimony. If the jury was not
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff suffered any disability as a result of the accident they
could also conclude that he was not entitled to any lost
wages.
In Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375,
412 P.2d 615 (1966) where the jury found the issues in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and assessed damages in the sum of "none", this court stated:
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" ... It is fundamental that it is the exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses.
This focuses attention upon the testimony of plaintiffs
president-manager, who of course had a high degree
of self-interest.

In the recent case of Holland v. Brown the plaintiff's claim for recovery likewise was based upon the
testimony of the plaintiff-manager. We stated therein

His self-interest may be a sufficient basis
for (the jury) rejecting it; and furthermore,
they are entitled to judge it in the light of their
experience in the everyday affairs of life. This
may well have included some legitimate doubts
as to the loss of profits plaintiff claims to have
sustained * * *. It is plainly apparent that they
were not satisfied by the necessary preponderance of evidence that plaintiff suffered any
actual loss and consequently awarded him
damages of only $1.00. Considering all of the
attendant factors, this appears to be within
the limits of what reasonable minds might conclude under the circumstances ... " (emphasis
added)

'

Defendant respectfully submits there is substantial evidence, together with fair inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, to support the jury verdict. The trial judge did
not abuse his discretion in allowing the verdict to stand.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT OR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT BUT DEFENDANT REQUESTS THIS COURT TO LET THE VERDICT STAND.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case defendant
moved for a directed verdict (R. 415-517). After the jury
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verdict was returned defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial
on all issues, or to allow the verdict returned by the jury on
June 24, 1970 to stand (R. 148-149). Defendant contends the
trial court committed error in failing to grant its motions
for a directed verdict or judgment N. 0. V. because there
was no evidence from which the jury could find the defendant negligent and the evidence clearly shows the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
However, defendant requests this Court to let the jury
verdi::t sbnd.
Defendant's truck was disabled from three to five
minutes before the accident happened (R. 353). Stopping
a disabled truck on the emergency stopping lane on the
O\'erpass would not constitute negligence. See Instruction
No. 16 (Section 41-6-101 U. C. A.) which provides:
"41-6-101 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Stopping or parki::ig on highway outside of business or
residential district no person shall stop, park, or leave
standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended,
upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway
when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such
vehicle off such part of said highway, but in every
event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite
a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of
other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle
shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in each
direction upon such highway."

"This section shall not apply to the driver of any
vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or main
traveled portion of a highway in such manner and to
such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and
temporarily leaving such disabled vehicle in such position." (emphasis added) (R. 120)
Failure to place the flares on the overpass within three to
five minutes after the truck was disabled would not consti-
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tute negligence. Even if the element of time was a question
for the jury, defendant contends the failure to get the flares
on the highway could not possibly have been a proximate
cause of the accident. The testimony of the plaintiff and
Floyd Robbins conclusively established that the plaintiff
crossed the collector road from the left hand lane to the
right hand lane behind the moving semi truck and trailer.
Whe::i the plaintiff changed lanes there was immediate
impact with the rear of the defendant's disabled truck.
Even if the flares had been placed to the rear of the disabled truck, the plaintiff obviously would not have seen
them in time to bring his pickup truck to a stop.
Roberts was required by regulation to place the flare
100 feet behind the disabled truck (R. 121).
The plaintiff testified at the trial he was going fifty
to sixty miles per hour just prior to the accident (R. 394)
and ::dmittcd that he had testified to fifty-five to sixty-five
miles per hour at his deposition (R. 394). At fifty miles
miles per hour the plaintiff's stopping distance would be
over 175 feet. If the flares had been on the highway, the
plaintiff would not have seen them in time to stop because
of the manner in which he attempted to pass the moving
semi truck and trailer.
The absence of flares on the highway was not a proximate cause of the accident.
Defendant also argued to the trial court in its motions
for directed verdict and judgment N. 0. V. that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for driving into the rear of a disabled truck in broad daylight
(R. 415-417).
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 1 Utah 2d 143,
263 P.2d 287 (1953) an action was brought for the death
of an automobile passenger who was killed when the car in
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which he was riding crashed into defendant's truck which
was parked so that its rear end extended five feet onto
the paved portion of the street. Judgment was entered for
the plaintiff and defendant appealed. This Court affirmed
holding that the prior negligent parking of defendant's
truck could reasonably be found to be a concurring proximate cause with the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger.
In the Hillyard case, supra, this Court was confronted
with a question of proximate cause. This Court held:
In applying the test of foreseeability to situations
where a negligently created pre-existing condition combines with a later act of negligence causing an injury,
the courts have drawn a clear-cut distinction between
two classes of cases. The first situation is where one
has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as
parking the truck) and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could not fair to observe,
but negligently failed to avoid it. The second situation
involves conduct of a later intervening actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until
it is too late to avoid it. In regard to the first situation
it is held as a matter of law that the later intervening
act does interrupt the natural' sequence of events and
cut off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial
actor. This is based upon the reasoning that it is not
reasonably to be foreseen nor expected that one who
actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous condition
in ample time to avert injury will fail to do so. On the
other hand, with respect to the second situation, where
the second actor fails to see the danger in time to
avoid it, it is held that a jury question exists, based
on the rationale that it can reasonably be anticipated
that circumstan.ces may arise wherein others may not
observe the dangerous condition until too late to escape it. The distinction is basically one between a
situation in which the second actor has sufficient time,
after being charged with knowledge of the hazard, to
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avoid it, and one in which the second actor negligently
becomes confronted with an eme1·gency situation. (em.
phasis added)
This Comt further stated that the :second actor would
be neglig2nt for getting into the emergency situation and
a jury question would exist as to whether the prior neg.
ligent parking of the truck was a concurring cause of the
accident. This statement infers that the negligence of the
second acto1· would be a concurring proximate cause.
In the Hillyard case, supra, this Court referred to the
case of l{liue v. M oye1· 191 A. 43 (Penn. 1937), a case in.
volving a similar quEStion of proximate cause.
In the Kline case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

stated:

" ... Where a second actor has become aware of the
existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and thereafter, by
an independent act of negligence, brings about an aecident, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability because the condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause.
Where, however, the second actor does not become appl'ised of such danger until his own negligence, added
to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the
accident inevitable the negligent acts of the two tort! easors are contributing causes and proximate factors
in the happe;1ing of the accident and impose liability
upon both of the guilty parties. (emphasis added)
In the instant case we do not have an innocent passenger trying to hold one of two negligent actors responsible
for his injuries. The plaintiff is the second actor, who,
through his own negligence created the emergency situation.
The plaintiff's negligent act was trying to pass the moving
semi truck and trailer as it moved into the left lane to pass
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the defendant's disabled truck. As the driver of the moving
semi truck drove to the left, the plaintiff should have
known that the truck driver was passing another vehicle.
The plaintiff attempted to pass the moving semi truck on
the right by driving into the right lane when he couldn't
see whnt was ahead.
Plaiutiff's negligence was a concurring proximate cause
of the accident as a matter of law.

Defendant's motions for a directed verdict or for judgment N. 0. V. should have been granted by the trial court.
Nevertheless, defendant asks this Court to let the verdict
st:rnd.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM
ANY ERROR IN THE VERDICT.
After the verdict was returned, the following exchange
occurred between Court and counsel while the jury was
still impaneled :
"The Court:
to the Court?
Mr. Nebeker:

Anything counsel wants to present
Nothing at this time, Your Honor.

The Court:

Okay, anything?

Mr. Hatch:

Not at this time?

The Court: Based on the verdict of the jury the
Court will order that a judgment be entered in the
record in this matter granting a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant,
Transport, Inc., in the amount set forth m the verdict
and the total amount let me see it again and read the
amount, $1,468.25 ... " (R. 440-441)
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Defendant claims that the failure of counsel for plaintiff to object to the jury verdict at the time it was announced precludes him from claiming there was error in
the verdict.
Rule 47 (r) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro.
vides:
"Correction o.f Verdict. If the verdict rendered is
or insufficient, it may be corrected by the
Jury under the advice of court, or the jury may be
sent out again."
Counsel for either party could have asked the court
to send the jury out again to deliberate further on the
ground the verdict as rendered was insufficient. Neither
counsel requested the jury be sent out again. The failure
to make such a request while the jury was still impaneled
prevents the plaintiff from now objecting to the insuf.
ficiency of the verdict.
Although we have been unable to find any Utah cases
dealing with waiver of alleged error in a jury verdict, this
Court has held that a party who either leads the court into
error or by his conduct approves error committed by the
court cannot later take advantage of such error. In Ludlow
v. Colorado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 P.2d
347 (1943) an action was brought to enjoin the defendant
from constructing its rendering plant on the grounds the
plant was operated as a nuisance. The lower court awarded
plaintiffs damages for impairment of the market value of
their property and the defendant appealed. One of the ques·
tions on appeal was whether or not the trial court deprived
the defendant of a jury trial. This Court held the defend·
ant's contention that it was deprived of a jury trial should be
rejected because the defendant had resisted the plaintiff's
demand for a jury trial. This Court stated:
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"It is also urged that by allowing all plaintiffs to
join and assert different claims for damages in the
same action instituted originally for injunctive relief,
the court deprived defendant of a jury triaf. The contention must be rejected by reason of the position taken
by defendant itself when plaintiffs requested a jury
trial. Not only did the defendant fail to demand a jury
trial, but the minutes show that on October 2, 1939,
when plantiffs demanded a jury for determination of
the question of damages, the defendant resisted such
demand. A party who takes a position which either
leads a court into error or by conduct approves the
error committed by the court, cannot lat·er take advantage of such error in procedure . .. " (emphasis added)
A number of courts have held that a party who fails to
objsct to the sufficiency of the verdict at the time it is returned is thereby precluded from claiming error in the
verdict.
In Fischer v. Howard, 271P.2d1059 (Ore. 1954), plaintiff sued defendant for assault and battery on two counts.
The jury awarded plaintiff no damages on his first count
and awarded $35.00 in specials, $1.00 in punitive damages
and $1.00 in general damages on the second count. When the
verdict was returned both counsel were present, but neither
made any ob:iection to the verdict nor asked that the jury
be sr::nt out again. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that
where the plaintiff's attorney was acquainted with the
verdict and made no objections to its receipt and no motion
that the cause be recommitted to the jury, he waived any
objections he might have to the verdict and was precluded
from moving for a new trial on grounds of an irregular
verdict. The court observed:

We are satisfied that when counsel has adequate
of the jury, to fam:ilopportunity, before the
iarize himself with the verdict, but makes no ob1ection
to the filing of the verdict or moves that the cause be
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remanded to the jury, he cannot later, by a motion for
a new trial, assail the verdict upon the ground that it
is irregular, ambiguous or informal. His failure to have
employed the procedure warranted by §5-319, (Similar
to Rule 47 (r) U.R.C.P.) supra, constitutes a waiver
upon his part of all objections which could have been
made on account of irregularity, informality or ambiguity in the verdict. After the discharge of the jury,
there remains nothing to be done except to construe the
verdict. (emphasis added)
The court summarized its holding as follows:
"We are satisfied that when the plaintiff, after acquainting himself with the verdict, made no objec.tions
to its receipt and no motion that the cause be recommitted to the jury, he waived the objections now under
analysis. Having waived them, they were unavail'able
as the basis for a motion for a new trial." Id. at 1075
Portions of Fischer were apparently overruled in the
subsequent decision of Stein v. Handy, 319 P.2d 935, 938939 (Ore. 1957), however, the language of Fischer heretofore cited (page 1075) was followed in Edmonds v. Erion,
350 P.2d 700 (Ore. 1960), where the jury awarded plaintiff
special damages on two causes of action, but allowed no
general damages. Counsel for plaintiff was present when
the verdict was announced, but made no objections to it at
the time it was rendered. The court held:
"Consonant with the rights reserved to litigants by
the constitution and laws, there must be reasonable
rules for bringing litigation to an end. We hold that

the right to object to a verdict because it allows
special damages not supported by an allowance of
general damages may be waived, and that such right
was waived by the plaintiff in the case." Id, at 702.
(emphasis added)
In DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734 (Wyo. 1963), an
automobile collision case, plaintiff was awarded special
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damages for hospital and medical expenses, but no general
damages for pain, suffering or disability. The Wyoming
Supreme Court held that the right to a new trial based
upon irregular and an allegedly improper verdict had been
waived by the plaintiff's failure to object to an instruction
which gave the jury full discretion to grant or deny general
damages and by plaintiff's failure to object when the verdict was returned. The court stated:
"The matter of waiver is grounded, among other
things, on the proposition that jury trials are timeconsuming and costly proceedings and while a litigant
is entitled to a fair trial, certain it is that he has
responsibilities to assist the trial court in bringing
about such a result. It will not do to permit a litigant
to remain mute and speculate on the outcome of a jury
trial on the record made with knowledge of irregularities or improprieties therein that might readily and
easily have been corrected during the trial and then,
when misfortune comes his way, to attempt to set the
invited result aside by way of a new trial because of
such matters. It is not fitting for the trial court or this
court knowingly to reward or condone such conduct."
(emphasis added)
The court further stated:
" ... on a record such as we have here, ... we must
say to appellant that despite the demonstrated reluctance of the jury to accept your extensive claims at
face value, it was incumbent upon you at l'east to attempt to see that a verdict in proper form was returned
by the jury, and not having done so we are not at
liberty to grant the relief requested. . . . Apparently
the trial court was satisfied that the total award made
by the jury was adequate compensation to the appellant." Id. at 740.
In Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal. 2d, 519, 75 P.2d 1063 (Cal.
1938) the Supreme Court of California in considering a
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verdict somewhat similar to the verdict in the instant case
said:
'
" ... The proper procedure where an informal or insufficient verdict has been returned is for the trial
court to require the jury to return for further deliberation. Kerrison v. Unger, 135 Cal.App. 607, 611,
27 P .2d 927. There can be no doubt, in view of the
record presented on appeal, that had the jury been
required by the trial court to retire for further deliberation under proper instructions, a proper verdict would
have been returned. It is well established by numerous
authorities that, when a verdict is not in proper form
and the jury is not required to clarify it, any error in
said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who
at the time of its rendition failed to make any request
that its formality or uncertainty to be corrected . ..."
(emphasis added)

In Hamilton v. Wrang, 221 A.2d 605 (Del. 1966), an
action for personal injuries and property damages arising
out of an automobile accident, the jury verdict was for car
damages only. On appeal, plaintiff stated that the verdict
was void because it failed to award damages to plaintiff
in a stated amount. It appeared that during the trial the
parties had stipulated that the amount of damages to the
car was $511.00. The plaintiff made no objection to the
form of the verdict at the time it was announced and the
jury was thereafter discharged. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the lower court decision upholding the jury
verdict stating:
"The failure of the plaintiffs to object to the form
of the verdict is fatal to their contention in this appeal
that it is a nullity because of its allegedly defective
form. It is necessary in order to take advantage of a
supposed defect in the form of a verdict that the aggrieved party take exception to it prior to the discharge
of the jury, and the failure to do so amounts to a waiver

1
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of the point. [citation] The reason for the rule is that
upon timely objection the trial judge prior to the jury's
discharge can instruct it to correct a faulty verd\c.t."
Id. at 606 (emphasis added)
In Cobb v. Cosby, 416 S. W.2d 222 (Mo. App. 1967),
an action to recover personal and property damages arising
out of a rear-end collision, it appeared that the jury had
awarded plaintiff a lump sum verdict which did not state
separately the amounts allowed for property damage. The
court held that the lump sum verdict did not conform to the
Missouri rule providing that the damages should be stated
separately. However, the court further held that the defendant waived his right to object to the verdict form
where he first asserted his objections to the verdict at the
time of his motion for new trial. The court stated:
" 'If the defendant had called the attention of the trial
judge to any infirmity in the verdict at the time the
verdict was returned, as it had the right to do so***,
he could have returned the jury to its room to further
,c,onsider the verdict. * * * [I] t must be remembered
this appeal is legally a charge that the circuit judge
committed error prejudicial to the defendant. Mani! estly it would be unfair to convict such a judge of an
error on account of a ruling to which the defendant
did not object at the time.'

* * *
" 'It is the duty of a trial court to examine the verdict
when it is returned; and, if such verdict is found to
be insufficient as to form, ambiguous, or inconsistent,
the court should require the jury to correct it * * *.
Needless to say, it is counsel's duty to call the attention
of the court to any inconsistency or irregularity in
such verdict.'" Id. at 225-226 (emphasis added)

The court went on to hold:
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"Having failed to make timely objection, defendant
cann?t wait until ju.dgment has ?een entered upon the I
verdict and then raise the quest10n for the first time ,
in his motion for new trial." Id. at 226.

The weight of authority supports the proposition that
the right to object to a verdict because it allows special
damages not supported by an allowance of general damages
may be waived.
In the instant case the trial judge specifically asked '
counsel if they requested anything further from the jury.
Plaintiff's counsel responded by stating: "Not at this time."
I
(R. 440).

The language of the Supreme Court of Wyoming in
the DeWitty case, supra, appropriately summarizes de- •
fendant's position.

" . . . but having in mind the plain purpose of our
statute to afford a jury the right to correct its own
mistakes, our previous pronouncement in the Innes
case, supra, and the convincing authority from other
jurisdictions, we do not think it harsh or unreasonable
to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded
during the trial, timely to bring a matter such as here
to the attention of the trial court in order that it might
be corrected, and failing in this that he shall not be
heard here to complain. To hold otherwise would seem
unfair to the jury, to the trial court, and to the other
litigants, to say nothing of the unnecessary loss of time
and expense." (emphasis added)

,
'
1

;
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POINT IV
IF A NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED, IT SHOULD BE
GRANTED ON ALL ISSUES.
Defendant earnestly contends that this Court should
let the verdict returned by the jury and judgment entered
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thereon stand without any modifications. If this Court determines that a new trial should be granted, then in fairness to both sides it should be granted on all issues.
In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701
( 1961), an action was brought for personal injuries resulting from a collision between defendant's truck and plaintiff's automobile, which was stopped on the highway. The
trial judge granted a new trial on the issue of damages and
defendants appealed. This Court held that under the circumstances the granting of a new trial was not an abuse of
discretion but that a new trial on all issues would be ordered.
This Court stated:
"Although the order granting a new trial on damages
only is permitted by our Rules of Civil Procedure, we
think that justice and fairness in this case require a
new trial on all the issues and not merely on the
amount of damages. It is so ordered. No costs
awarded."
CONCLUSION
The jury awarded plaintiff judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,468.25. Judge Cornaby was satisfied that the total award made by the jury was adequate
compensation to the plaintiff. The trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in allowing the jury verdict to stand as there
is substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict.
Plaintiff waived his right to complain about the verdict by failing to ask the trial court to have the jury deliberate further on damages. As Judge Rossman in Fischer
v. Howard, supra, succinctly stated: "A loser should not by
design get 'two bites at the cherry.' "
Although defendant takes the position that it was not
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negligent and that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law, it respectfully urges this Court to affirm
the judgment of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Stephen B. Nebeker
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents

